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Judicial Selection, Judicial Disqualification, and the Role of
Money in Judicial Campaigns
Charles Gardner Geyh*
In recent years, the judicial selection debate has focused with greater
frequency and intensity on the role that money plays in judicial campaigns.
Within the legal establishment, which tends to be less skeptical of judicial
motives, lawyers, judges, and law professors express their concern in terms of the
"perception" that campaign dollars influence judicial decision-making.'
Outsiders, in contrast, who are often more suspicious, speak of money buying
influence or justice being for sale. Polling data supports the proposition that a
significant majority of the American public thinks money influences judicial
decisions, and this perception in turn damages the courts' legitimacy.' The
problem concerns campaign contributions made directly to a judge's campaign
and indirect support independently expended on the judge's behalf. The problem
also concerns contributors and supporters who are pending and future litigants or
lawyers, and groups with a particular interest in the outcomes of cases that the
judicial candidates are likely to decide. The proposed remedies have run the
gamut from imposing dollar limits on campaign contributions, requiring the
public disclosure of campaign contributors, and publicly financing judicial
campaigns 4 to the engaging and thoughtful proposals presented in this
Symposium: one by Meryl Chertoff, to end judicial elections altogether; and the
other by Dmitry Bam, to reform applicable rules for judicial disqualification.'
Professor Chertoff argues that the best way to reduce the corrosive impact of
money in judicial selection is to end contested judicial elections. She contends
that by moving toward a system commonly known as "merit selection"-in
which the governor appoints a judge from a pool of candidates prescreened by an
independent commission, and who later goes before the voters unopposed in a
* Associate Dean of Research and John F. Kimberling Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer
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1. COMM'N ON PUB. FIN. OF JUD. CAMPAIGNS, Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns, 2002 A.B.A.
STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUD. INDEPENDENCE 4 [hereinafter Commission Report].
2. See, e.g., Bill Moyers Journal (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.
pbs.org/moyers/journal/02192010/transcript4.html?print (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Matthew
Mosk, Study Shows Money Flooding into Campaigns for State Judgeships, ABC NEWS, Mar. 17, 2010,
http://abcnews.go.comlBlotter/study-shows-money-flooding-campaigns-state-judgeships/story?id=10120048
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. James Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory and "New
Style" Judicial Campaigns, 102 AM. POL. SC. REV 59, 67-69 (2008).
4. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 35-6.
5. See generally Meryl J. Chertoff, Trends in Judicial Elections in the States, 42 McGEORGE L. REV. 47
(2010); Dmitry Barn, Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42
McGEORGE L. REV. 65 (2010).
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retention election-the problematic influence of campaign contributions and
support will be diminished, if not eliminated.'
Were I hostile to Professor Chertoff s basic argument, I could trot out the
usual counterarguments: elections are democracy-enhancing; they promote
judicial accountability; they curb the excesses of judges predisposed to act upon
their ideological predilections; the merit selection system would deprive citizens
of their right to vote; merit selection would delegate the task of judicial selection
to an elitist cabal of experts; that it would move the politics of judicial selection
from the ballot box to the backroom; and that it would produce judges who are
no better than their elected counterparts.' However, I am not hostile to her
argument; moreover, even if I were, opponents of judicial elections have made
the basic arguments for and against judicial elections so many times that to repeat
those arguments yet again would be law's answer to an "I Love Lucy" rerun.
Those who share Professor Chertoff s skepticism of judicial elections (like
myself), are unlikely to be moved by the above-listed arguments. The true
conversation stopper for advocates of appointive systems is political reality. We
can debate the relative merits of elective and appointive systems in the vacuum
of law review symposia, but at the end of the day, sizable majorities of the
American public support judicial elections and are loath to abandon them. That
point has been made before too, and Professor Chertoff has an answer: through
public education and the leadership of figures such as Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the public's support for elections may soften and the willingness of
more legislatures to make merit selection seriously may grow.' Professor
Chertoff may be right. Then again, I likewise had an answer when I confronted
this issue nearly a decade ago-that the anti-election movement would capitalize
upon embarrassing "bellwether events" that exposed judicial elections as
undesirable-and am still waiting for such events to occur.'o
Arguments over the prospects for success of merit selection and arguments
over the virtues of merit selection share one thing in common: their propensity
toward categorical pronouncements. Professor Stephen Burbank has long warned
against treating judicial independence as monolithic, and the time has come to
say the same about judicial selection." We argue as though what is good for
6. Chertoff, supra note 5, at 58
7. See Chris W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2 (2009);
Julius Uehlein & David H. Wilderman, Opinion, Why Merit Selection Is Inconsistent with Democracy, 106
DICK. L. REv. 769, 769-71 (2002) (examining organized labor's opposition to merit selection); Michael Debow,
The Debate Over Judicial Elections and State Court Judicial Selection, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1372, 1379-
80 (2008) (transcript of Panel 2; Judicial Elections, Speech During Campaigns: Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White and its Consequences And Campaign Finance); Michael DeBow et al., The Case for Partisan Judicial
Elections, 33 U. TOL. REV. 393, 396 (2002).
8. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 52-53 (2003).
9. Chertoff, supra note 5, at 9, 51.
10. Geyh, supra note 8, at 74.
11. Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 325-26
(2003).
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California must be good for North Dakota-that judicial elections are
categorically good or bad without regard to the unique constitutional culture and
political landscape of particular jurisdictions. And we make comparably
categorical statements about the prospects for success of merit selection
initiatives, as if attitudes toward judicial elections and the public's receptivity to
change are necessarily the same in Minnesota as in Mississippi. The reason is
obvious enough: we dress our arguments in one-size-fits-all muumuus, to cover
intellectual obesity. Going state by state takes exercise and work. However, for
those of us who see this not as an academic diversion but as a law reform
campaign, refining the focus is critical.
Merit selection systems are appealing in jurisdictions where the public trusts
its judges and their expertise enough to let them make decisions with only limited
electoral accountability (in the form of retention elections). In such jurisdictions,
the price of contested elections, expressed in terms of the corrupting influence of
money and special interests, may be too dear and cause the rank and file to give
appointive systems a more serious look. Conversely, in jurisdictions that are
suspicious of their judges, relinquishing the franchise right is a non-starter. To
the extent that voters in such jurisdictions exhibit relatively high levels of
confidence in their courts, such confidence may be due to electoral accountability
itself. These voters may be troubled by the influence of money on judicial
elections, but not to the extent of shaking their confidence in judicial elections. In
such jurisdictions, the answer to concerns over the influence of campaign
contributions may lie in more incremental reforms, such as public financing.
Moving away from a monolithic perspective on judicial selection means
more than respecting differences between jurisdictions; it also means recognizing
that different times call for different approaches. During times of high political
anxiety over judges and courts, when judges are under attack and the legal
establishment has circled the wagons, it is tempting for court defenders to seek
refuge in merit selection. When judicial independence is put at risk by massive
infusions of cash into judicial campaigns-cash aimed at rewarding or removing
judges for one of their decisions-proposing an end to judicial elections may
seem like a timely remedy. But that is also the point when interest in judicial
elections is greatest and the perceived need to hold judges accountable to the
electorate is highest. It bears note that merit selection was conceived amid the
anti-court agitation of the Progressive Era in the early twentieth century, but
states did not begin to adopt merit selection systems in earnest until calmer times,
in the aftermath of the New Deal." My point is simply to reiterate an inevitable
irony hinted at in the preceding paragraph: when the electorate is put into a lather
over its judges by the media, campaign advertising bankrolled by interested
observers, or unpopular decisions made by the judges themselves, the perceived
12. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why it Matters for Judicial
Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1262 (2008) (noting that a merit selection system was devised in
1913, and that Missouri adopted the first merit selection system in 1940).
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need to protect judicial independence and the rule of law by moving away from
contested elections may seem greatest. But it is also then when the perceived
need for electoral accountability is greatest, and when, in the public's mind, the
continued legitimacy of the courts may depend on voters retaining control over
judicial selection.
My point is not that we should resign ourselves to contested judicial elections
and get on with our lives. My point is to underscore the need for reformers to be
more opportunistic, to pick their battles with greater care, and when necessary, to
bide their time. In the meantime, we can look to make a bad situation better by
more incremental means, such as disqualification reform.
For Professor Chertoff, the case of Caperton v. A. T. Massey Energy
Company," with its extraordinary, independent campaign waged by the
defendant's CEO to replace a justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court while
the defendant's appeal was pending, underscores the need to end contested
judicial elections.14 For Dmitry Bam, in contrast, Caperton signals the need to
reform disqualification rules and procedure. Mr. Bam first explains that
disqualification under state and federal law is based on whether the judge at issue
has created an appearance of partiality." Second, he tells us that in Caperton the
Court moved away from an appearance-based standard and toward a probability-
of-actual-bias standard for disqualification. 6 Third, he posits that this is a good
thing because an appearance-based regime logically requires over-recusal insofar
as "relatively minor contributions-even those that are rejected-may produce
an appearance of bias . . . ."" Finally, he concludes that the move toward a
standard of probable bias in disqualification should accompany procedural
reform in which one judge is assigned the task of assessing the likelihood of
another judge's actual bias, because judges cannot be counted upon to assess the
extent of their own bias. 8
I agree with Mr. Bam's conclusion that procedural reform of the sort he
proposes is desirable, but take a different path to that end. His first claim, that the
current disqualification regime is appearance-based, is true to a point but
overstated. Nowhere does the term "appearance" occur in the disqualification
rule itself, but it can be inferred: a judge's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,"' 9 within the meaning of the rule, if the judge appears partial. His
point is overstated, however, insofar as this appearance-based approach to
disqualification is in the nature of a catch-all, the application of which is limited
to situations not otherwise addressed by more specific sections of the
13. 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009).
14. Chertoff, supra note 5, at 48.
15. Barn, supra note 5, at 67.
16. Id. at 66.
17. Id. at 76.
18. Id. at 82.
19. MODELCODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2001).
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disqualification rule. Indeed, the disqualification rule employs three distinct
approaches simultaneously: one calls for disqualification for perceived or
apparent bias (when "impartiality might reasonably be questioned"); the second
calls for disqualification for actual bias; 20 and the third calls for disqualification
for specifically enumerated conflicts of interest (e.g., when the judge has a
financial interest in the case or when a close relative is a party). 2 1
It is true that the Model Code employs the catch-all "appearance" part of the
rule as an organizing principle with the other two pieces as subsets, and that the
most controversial disqualification cases concern an application of the catch-all.
The rule's "conflicts" section is worthy of particular note here, however, because
it offers a potential remedy to the underlying disqualification problem that
animates Caperton and Mr. Bam's argument: drafting a specific rule requiring
judges to disqualify themselves when they have received X amount of financial
support for their campaigns, during Y period of time, from Z individuals or
organizations. The American Bar Association has already drafted a
disqualification rule for direct contributions to judicial campaigns that
jurisdictions may broaden to address independent expenditures. 22 One may
ultimately conclude that the complexities of drafting such a rule would make it
unworkable, but it is certainly a remedy worth discussing. A multi-state study
conducted by the American Judicature Society in the 1990s found that judges
were less ambivalent about disqualification for specifically enumerated conflicts
of interest than for real or perceived bias.23 Such a finding is intuitive: clearly
articulated rules are easier to understand and apply than amorphous standards.
Mr. Bam's second point, that in Caperton, the Court adopted a probability
standard for disqualification in lieu of an appearances standard, may overstate
what the Court actually did.24 He rightly notes that the Court took pains to
distinguish the due process standard for disqualification it was applying in
Caperton from the more exacting standards of state disqualification rules, which,
in the words of the Court, "provide more protection than due process requires."
The Court's objective here is sensible both substantively and strategically.
Substantively, it is important to distinguish between conduct that warrants
disqualification as a matter of sound public policy under state law, and conduct
so egregious that it requires disqualification to protect the basic due process
rights to which litigants are entitled under the United States Constitution.
Strategically, it is important for the Court to keep the floodgates closed by
20. MODEL CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A)(1) (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (b)(1) (2001).
21. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUct R. 2.1 1(A)(2)-(6) (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2)-(5) (2001).
22. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.1 1(A)(4) (2007).
23. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND ATTITUDES 1-2 (1995) (noting that almost one-half of judges had an
inclination towards disqualification for conflicts of interest while only one-third were inclined to disqualify for
real or perceived bias or prejudice).
24. Bam, supra note 5, at 78.
25. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009).
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creating a buffer zone between ordinary disqualification questions that are within
the exclusive province of state courts, and extraordinary disqualification
questions that implicate due process concerns and confer jurisdiction on the
United States Supreme Court.
Without disputing that the Court articulated a probability of bias standard in
lieu of an appearances standard as a way to differentiate between the
requirements of the U.S. Constitution and state law, I see no way to apply the
Court's probability standard without a resort to appearances. To reiterate, the
term "appearance" does not occur in the disqualification rule but is inferred from
the objective standard that the rule creates. By asking whether a judge's
impartiality "might reasonably be questioned," we are asking how the judge's
conduct would appear to a reasonable person.26 In Caperton, the Court likewise
imposed what it called an "objective" standard,27 which by its nature requires us
to examine the judge's conduct from the perspective of an objective or
reasonable person. The Court tells us that we should not undertake to crawl
inside the head of the judge to determine if he is actually biased, but should ask
whether a reasonable person in the judge's position would probably be biased.28
But that is simply another way of asking whether such a judge appears biased.
This is not a game of blackjack, where an objective observer or participant can
count cards and calculate probabilities with mathematical certainty. Rather,
"probabilities" can only be divined from appearances. If a judge receives
significant campaign support from the CEO of a corporate defendant while the
case is pending and that support constitutes a high percentage of the monetary
support the judge received, he is probably biased-because that is the way it
appears.
My point is not to conflate the two tests that the Court seeks to distinguish.
They are different, but not because one implicates appearances and the other does
not. Whereas the disqualification rule and statute ask whether a judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the newly minted due process
standard asks, in effect, whether the judge's impartiality would reasonably be
questioned.
Mr. Bam's third claim-that appearance-based disqualification rules promote
over-recusal 29-is exaggerated. He cites survey data for the proposition that the
public thinks campaign contributions, even relatively modest ones, influence
judicial decision-making. From this finding, he concludes that campaign
contributions necessarily create an appearance of partiality, triggering the need
for recusal under an appearance-based disqualification rule-an outcome he
26. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUcT R. 2.11(A) (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2001).
27. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
28. Id.
29. Bam, supra note 5, at 78.
30. Id.
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regards as excessive and undesirable.' I agree that such a result would be absurd,
but I do not think that the existing rule dictates absurd results. The applicable rule
speaks in terms of whether impartiality "might reasonably be questioned," with
"reasonably" being the operative word.32 Courts and commentators explain that
we must therefore ask whether an objective observer who is fully informed of the
relevant facts might question the judge's impartiality.33 Public surveys are not
limited to the well informed. Mr. Barn and I agree that mass disqualification is
unnecessary for judges who receive campaign support from litigants or lawyers
because, as relatively well-informed observers of judicial campaigns, we find it
unreasonable to suspect that modest contributions to major campaigns influence
judges in material ways. That explains, at least in part, why judges rarely
disqualify themselves from cases in which lawyers or litigants have contributed
to their campaigns. '
There are undoubtedly judges who, as Mr. Bam speculates, either exploit the
softness of appearance-based disqualification rules and step aside unnecessarily
to avoid unpleasant or politically sensitive cases, or out of an over-abundance of
caution. Such a strategy, however, runs afoul of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which provides that "[a] judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the
judge, except when disqualification is required. . . . Commentary
accompanying this rule explains:
Unwarranted disqualification may bring public disfavor to the court and
to the judge personally. The dignity of the court, the judge's respect for
fulfillment of judicial duties, and a proper concern for the burdens that
may be imposed upon the judge's colleagues require that a judge not use
disqualification to avoid cases that present difficult, controversial, or
unpopular issues.
The more serious problem, and the one that brings Professor Chertoff and
Mr. Barn together in this forum, is that there are judges who hear cases after
receiving substantial campaign support from lawyers or litigants-support so
31. Id.
32. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (2007); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2001).
33. JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET, JEFFREY SHAMAN, & CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS, § 4.04 (4th ed. 2007) (citing cases that explain the test is an objective standard).
34. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2006, at Al ("In the 215 cases with the most direct potential conflicts of interest" arising from campaign
contributions, "justices recused themselves just 9 times."). I am more troubled by the possibility that judges are
not disqualifying themselves when they should; my point for purposes here, however, is that there is no real
foundation for the concern that an amorphous appearance standard is leading judges to over-disqualify
themselves from cases in which their supporters appear as lawyers or litigants.
35. MODEL CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT R. 2.7 (2007).
36. Id.
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substantial that their impartiality is put in doubt." The appearance standard
embedded in the disqualification rule may have been designed to provide judges
with what Mr. Bam calls a "fig leaf,"38 enabling them to withdraw from cases by
conceding that they created an appearance of partiality without admitting actual
bias. Ironically, however, the Code of Judicial Conduct as a whole transforms
that fig leaf into a stinging nettle.
The Model Code of Judicial Conduct situates impartiality at the heart of the
judicial role with the very first sentence of its preamble: "[a]n independent, fair[,]
and impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice." 9 The first
words of Canon 1 declare "[a] judge shall uphold and promote the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary . .. [,]" while the first words of Canon
2 state, "[a] judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially . . . ."
Against this backdrop, when a party moves to disqualify a judge for actual bias, it
amounts to an accusation that the judge has failed to live up to the expectations
of the Code-an accusation the truth of which judges understandably loath to
concede. The appearance standard softens that accusation by downgrading an
actual bias problem to an apparent bias problem, but the Code looks askance at
judges who create appearance problems too. Rule 1.2 states that "[a] judge shall
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the ...
impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety." 4' An accompanying comment explains that "[c]onduct that
compromises or appears to compromise the ... impartiality of a judge
undermines public confidence in the judiciary."42 In other words, like the judge
who concedes actual bias, the judge who admits to creating apparent bias has, at
least implicitly, conducted himself sub-optimally, a concession many judges will
be reluctant to make.
Moreover, judges are not stupid. To the extent disqualification for an
appearance of partiality is widely recognized as a "fig leaf," which allows biased
judges to step aside without conceding actual bias, judges understand that
challenges to their perceived impartiality are, in reality, candy-coated challenges
to their actual impartiality. In Caperton, Chief Justice Roberts, writing on behalf
of the four dissenters, defended a muscular presumption of impartiality in terms
that reflect the insult he saw embedded in disqualification motions generally.
"There is a 'presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators[,]"' he declared. 43 "All judges take an oath to uphold the
37. One such judge would be West Virginia Justice Brent Benjamin, whose refusal to disqualify himself
gave rise to the Supreme Court's decision in Caperton. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252
(2009).
38. Bam, supra note 5, at 79 n.91.
39. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Preamble (2007).
40. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canons 1, 2 (2007).
41. Id. at R. 1.2.
42. Id. at Comment to R. 1.2.
43. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2267 (2009) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin 421
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Constitution and apply the law impartially, and we trust that they will live up to
this promise."" By negative implication, for the Chief Justice, a motion to
41disqualify impugns the target judge's honesty and integrity. My point is a
simple one: the concern that an appearance standard contributes to over-
disqualification is misplaced; the negative implications underlying an accusation
of perceived bias are such that under-disqualification remains the far more
serious problem. That conclusion is corroborated by the results of a multi-state
study of judicial disqualification conducted in the 1990s, which found that judges
were ambivalent about disqualification generally.46
My reaction to Mr. Bam's final point-that we should move toward a
standard of probable bias in disqualification accompanied by procedural reform,
in which a different judge is assigned the task of assessing the likelihood of a
47judge's actual bias -is mixed. I am at peace with resolving due process
questions with reference to the so-called "probability of bias standard" that the
Caperton majority created. 48 Although I share the dissenters' concern that such a
standard is vague to the point of being unmanageable,49 one may say the same of
the Due Process Clause itself. Because the majority took pains to marginalize its
probability of bias standard by limiting it to rare and extreme cases,o the
difficulty and confusion that such a standard will create strikes me as limited.
Underlying Mr. Bam's proposal, however, is skepticism of the appearances
standard that I do not share, for reasons elaborated upon above. At least as far as
the substantive bases for disqualification are concerned, I find myself defending
the post-Caperton status quo: retain an appearance regime (coupled with
disqualification for actual bias and specifically enumerated conflicts of interest)
as the basis for disqualification in state court and confine due process/probability
of bias analysis to those rare days when the weather in hell calls for a sweater,
and a probability of bias can be established.
Mr. Bam's proposal that we assign a different judge than the one whose
disqualification is sought to decide the motion" strikes me as an important part of
a package of procedural reforms that are well worth considering. In a persuasive
article, Professor Amanda Frost advocates a "process-oriented approach to
judicial recusal," which would normalize the disqualification procedure by
infusing it with traditional procedural protections that accompany other aspects
U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. SHAMAN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 23, at 1-2.
47. Bam, supra note 5 at 77.
48. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2262.
49. Id. at 2269 (Roberts, Chief J., dissenting) ("the standard the majority articulates-"probability of
bias"-fails to provide clear, workable guidance for future cases").
50. Id. at 2263 (referring to Caperton as "an exceptional case").
51. Bam,supra note 5 at 80.
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of adjudication.52 She proposes amending the disqualification rules to enable
litigants to frame the disqualification question by making explicit the procedure
parties follow when seeking disqualification, reassign disqualification motions to
a different judge, encourage the challenged judge to respond to motions to
disqualify, and require judges to give reasoned explanations for disqualification
decisions." It may seem puzzling that such basic procedural safeguards are not
already a part of the law of disqualification, but it bears emphasis that
disqualification for actual bias (and apparent bias) did not become an established
fixture of the recusal landscape until the 1970s.- Now that bias-based
disqualification is entering its adolescence, more scholars, like Mr. Bam and
Professor Frost, have begun to take disqualification procedure more seriously-
and rightly so.
My only objection to Mr. Bam's proposal to assign disqualification motions
to a different judge," is that he limits it to "probable bias" questions. He is right
to argue that judges are ill-equipped to assess whether they themselves are
probably biased-a problem avoided by assigning disqualification for probable
bias to a different judge. The same may be said, however, in cases where judges
are accused only of apparent bias. The Code of Conduct commits judges to avoid
the appearance of impropriety (which subsumes an appearance of partiality). For
that reason, many judges will-quite understandably-have difficulty seeing
how or acknowledging when their own conduct runs afoul of that principle. Mr.
Bam rightly notes that judges apply a "reasonable person" standard in a variety
of contexts.16 It is one thing, however, for a judge to divine whether a "reasonable
person" would construe a given statement as defamatory, and quite another for a
judge to determine how a reasonable person would construe the conduct of the
very judge who must decide what "reasonable" means. Studies in psychology
reveal that people do poorly at assessing the extent of their own bias, and it is
thus fair to suspect that they will likewise do poorly at assessing whether others
would reasonably think they are biased." Because I regard under-disqualification
as the more serious problem, I favor reassigning all disqualification questions to
a different judge than the one whose impartiality is in question.
52. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U.
KAN. L. REv. 531, 592-93 (2005).
53. Id. at 582-83, 588-89.
54. E. Wayne Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct 61-62 (1973) (discussing the
addition of "personal bias and prejudice" as a grounds for disqualification in the 1972 Model Code of Judicial
Conduct).
55. Ban, supra note 5, at 79.
56. Id. at 78.
57. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution in
Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49,49-50 (Thomas
Gilovich et al., eds., 2002); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 779 (2001).
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